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I. INTRODUCTION
In Hagen v. Burmeister & Associates, Inc.,1 the Minnesota
Supreme Court considered for the first time the issue of employer 
vicarious liability for an employee’s violation of the Minnesota 
Uniform Trade Secret Act (MUTSA).2  The underlying issue of 
† Ms. Dobash is Vice President and Senior Counsel with Taro
Pharmaceuticals U.S.A., Inc.  The views expressed in this article are those of the 
author and do not necessarily reflect the views of Taro Pharmaceuticals.
1. 633 N.W.2d 497 (Minn. 2001).
2. MINN. STAT. § 325C.01-325C.07 (2001).
1
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theft of another person’s property is rooted in antiquity and
certainly predates our modern judicial systems.  The doctrine of 
employer vicarious liability evolved more recently but is now
embedded in the American tort system.
The perils of piracy, plunder, theft and robbery have impeded 
commerce for centuries3 and have produced a variety of questions 
in every system of jurisprudence.4  The Rhodians reduced maritime 
law into a code in order to apply principles of justice to the risks of 
navigation and commerce, and the Romans subsequently preserved 
or reformed these laws.5  As commerce recovered from its decline 
in the dark ages, the laws began to again address commercial 
concerns in order to foster this activity. Many claimed to be the first 
to establish a theory of mutual rights of traders and to secure 
redress of commercial injuries.6  Protection of trade secret
commercial property was somewhat slower to emerge than
protections for other commercial property due to the intangible 
nature of the subject matter.7  In the United States, trade secret law 
began to emerge in the 1800s.  In its 1868 opinion of Peabody v. 
Norfolk,8 which shaped United States trade secret law, the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court stated, “[i]t is the policy of 
the law, for the advantage of the public, to encourage and protect 
invention and commercial enterprise.”9
Fast-forward to the present, the age of technology, a free-
wheeling era in which information, innovative ideas, computer 
3. See 3 HENRY HALLAM, HISTORY OF EUROPE DURING THE MIDDLE AGES 44-45
(1899) (describing obstacles to trade in the Middle Ages).
4. Id.  at 61; Robert G. Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret Law: Doctrine in Search 
of Justification, 86 CAL. L. REV. 241, 251 n.54 (1998) (stating that “secrets might 
have received some protection in Roman law, although the matter is open to some 
dispute”) (citing A. Arthur Schiller, Trade Secrets and the Roman Law: The Actio Servi 
Corrupti, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 837 (1930)).
5. See HALLAM, supra note 3, at 61.
6. Id. at 51-52 (discussing how the occupation of merchant became more 
honorable and placed on footing with landed proprietors and describing how 
commerce became leading subject of English statutes from accession of Edward 
III); id. at 45 (“Robbery, indeed, is the constant theme both of the Capitularies 
and of the Anglo-Saxon laws; one has more reason to wonder at the intrepid thirst 
for lucre, which induced a very few merchants to exchange the products of 
different regions, than to ask why no general spirit of commercial activity
prevailed.”); id. at 62-63 (discussing early codes and regulations, including Il 
Consolato del Mare).
7. Bone, supra note 4, at 252.
8. 98 Mass. 452 (1868).
9. Id. at 457; Bone, supra note 4, at 252 (discussing Peabody v. Norfolk, 98 
Mass. 452 (1868) and history of trade secret law).
2
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code and other intangibles can be a company’s most valuable 
assets.10  Novel technologies, innovation, internet and other
communication advances have expanded the world’s horizons, 
sparked ground-breaking commercial opportunities and created a 
whole new breed of industrial competition.11  Rather than raiding 
cargo and freight, competitors and others ransack companies for 
blueprints, software code, formulations, research and development, 
plans, ideas, information and data.12  Corporate espionage is a 
common and costly hazard, with the theft of trade secrets and 
other intellectual property rights in the United States costing 
companies billions of dollars.13  Service industries have sprung to 
10. Bone, supra note 4, at 243.
11. See Raytheon Co. Settles Corporate Spy Case with AGES Group, WALL ST. J., May 
13, 1999, at A18 (reporting Raytheon’s settlement regarding alleged corporate
espionage in an unsuccessful attempt to undermine competitor’s bid for $450 
million contract to service U.S. military aircraft).  According to David Forbes, 
chairman of Quo Vadis International, a Denver-based security consulting
company:
A big reason corporate spying has increased recently is that
competition among businesses has gotten fiercer.  As American society 
in general has become more aggressive, even hostile, and less tolerant, 
those behaviors have extended to businesses, as well . . . . You can’t 
separate the way people see society and politics from the way they see 
the conduct of a corporation.
Paula Moore, Workplace Violence Not Worst Threat, DENV. BUS. J., Aug. 24, 2001, at 
3A.
12. See Company News: Medinol Accuses Boston Scientific of Theft and Fraud, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 6, 2001, at C4 (reporting Medinol Ltd.’s accusations that competitor 
Boston Scientific Corporation stole technology for stents used in artery-clearing
angioplasties); Paul Elias, Prosecutors Stumble in Efforts to Battle Biotech Espionage,
ASSOC. PRESS NEWSWIRE, August 5, 2002 (reporting various trade secret smuggling 
cases, including lab employees stealing vials of biological materials, Alzheimer’s 
disease research, nuclear weapons data, and newly discovered genes); Andrew 
Harris, Missouri Jury Awards $118 Million, NAT’L L.J., Mar. 25, 2002, at A25 
(reporting finding against Hartford Life Ins. Co. for theft of method of managing 
corporate life insurance investments); Technology Briefing Software: Avant Executives
Sentenced, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2001, at C4 (reporting sentencing of six executives of 
Avant Corporation for stealing source code for routing from software rival
Cadence Design Systems).
13. See Lilli Hsieh et al., Intellectual Property Crimes, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 899, 
900 (1998); Darren S. Tucker, The Federal Government’s War on Economic Espionage,
18 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 1109, 1119-21 (1997) (stating that according to 1998 
National Institute of Justice study, 48% of high-tech companies have been victim 
of trade secrets theft and describing estimated U.S. corporate trade secret loss 
estimates as $2 billion to $260 billion, and $400 billion if overseas operations are 
included, along with one to six million lost jobs); Neil King Jr. & Jess Bravin, Call It 
Mission Impossible Inc.—Corporate-Spying Firms Thrive, WALL ST. J., July 3, 2000, at B1 
(citing PriceWaterhouseCoopers study showing theft of proprietary information 
3
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life, specializing in both performing “competitive intelligence” 
services14 and in combating industrial espionage.15  Our federal and 
state governments have also responded by adapting existing laws 
and remedies to the changing situations and enacting fresh
legislation targeted at theft of trade secrets and other intellectual 
property.16
Companies are especially vulnerable to theft of trade secrets by 
former employees.17  According to one expert, ninety percent of 
cost Fortune 1000 companies $45 billion in 1999); Elias, supra note 12 (reporting 
allegedly that stolen vials of biological “glue” used in stem cell experiments worth 
$1 billion “in the right hands”); Riva Richmond, Rising Layoffs Are a Boon to Internet 
Security Firms, WALL ST. J., June 5, 2001, at B11F (“The CSI/FBI survey showed 186 
companies lost $377.8 million from computer crime in the past year. Financial 
fraud and data theft, both of which typically involve insiders, accounted for 65% of 
those losses.”).
14. Harry Wingo, Note, Dumpster Diving and the Ethical Blindspot of Trade Secret
Law, 16 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 195, 215 (1997) (noting that [c]ompetitive
intelligence has become so common place [sic] that it is considered an industry 
complete with its own professional association—the Society of Competitive
Intelligence Professionals (SCIP)”); Competition Drives Industrial Spying; Espionage: 
Some Companies May Skirt Ethics, Laws to Keep an Eye on Their Rivals, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 
3, 2001, at C3 (describing market intelligence and corporate espionage services). 
The intelligence industry stresses the difference between “competitive
intelligence” and “industrial espionage”; according the Society of Competitive
Intelligence Professionals, “[c]ompetitive intelligence is the legal and ethical
collection and analysis of information about the competitive environment . . . .
Corporate espionage implies the theft of trade secrets, which is both illegal and 
unethical.” Id.  According to Kroll Inc., “[t]he market for business intelligence is 
worth about $2 billion a year worldwide, including services ranging from detective 
work to clipping news articles.” Id.
15. See, e.g., Richmond, supra note 13 (describing internet security firms’ 
booming business resulting from massive layoffs in computer industry); King & 
Bravin, supra note 13, at B1 (discussing “competitive intelligence” subindustry);
American Society for Industrial Security, Educational Sessions, SEC. MGMT., July 1, 
2002, at 96 (listing numerous corporate security consultants and seminars
regarding industrial security, including protection of trade secrets).
16. See generally Hsieh, supra note 13 (analyzing various intellectual property 
crime concepts and legislation, including Economic Espionage Act of 1996,
National Stolen Property Act of 1934, Uniform Trade Secrets Act (amended 
1985), mail and wire fraud statutes, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act of 1994 (RICO), Trademark Counterfeiting Act, Copyright 
Felony Act of 1984, and the Database Protection Bill of 1998-99 (not passed into 
law).
17. See Bone, supra note 4, at 244 (stating that majority of trade secret cases 
involve disloyal employees) (citing 1 Roger M. Milgrim, MILGRIM ON TRADE
SECRETS § 5.02[1] (1996)); Ex-Lucent Scientists Indicted for Plotting Theft of Trade 
Secrets, WALL ST. J., June 1, 2001, at B8 (reporting charges against two former 
research scientists at Lucent Technologies Inc. for conspiracy to steal Lucent trade 
secrets for use in their own business); Richmond, supra note 13, at B11F.
4
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trade secret theft and other corporate crime involves a senior
employee.18  Not only do many employees have access to a
company’s trade secrets and the ability to easily copy and transmit 
them, but employees are more educated, mobile and change jobs 
much more often today.19  Increased relocations, mergers,
acquisitions, restructurings, layoffs and firings have also
contributed to loss of job security, as well as to  “layoff rage,” which 
often results in a corresponding loss of sense of loyalty to the 
former employer.20  Greed also motivates trade secret theft.21  As a 
result, employees have increased opportunities and motivation to 
18. Moore, supra note 11, at 3A (quoting Bruce Wimmer, head of Pinkerton 
Consulting & Investigations security services company).  According to Wimmer:
[M]any companies don’t realize, or they deny, how exposed they are to 
thieves who are on the payroll. One reason for that, and why internal 
crime can be so successful, is that senior company people who have 
access to the most valuable information and products are often
involved . . . .  And that’s hard for the company to admit because it 
trusts senior staff.  It can’t not trust them.
Id.
19. Peter J.G. Toren, The Prosecution of Trade Secrets Under Federal Law, 22 PEPP.
L. REV. 59, 60 (1994); see also, Tucker, supra note 13, at 1114 (discussing ease of 
stealing intangible property, increased employee access to trade secrets, greater 
opportunities to gain knowledge of trade secrets through changing jobs, and 
advances in communications); Erin M. Davis, Comment, The Doctrine of Respondeat 
Superior: An Application to Employers’ Liability for the Computer or Internet Crimes
Committed by Their Employees, 12 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 683, 688 (2002) (observing 
that “computer technology in the workplace creates a unique opportunity for 
employees to engage in activities that are contrary to their employer’s interests 
and business goals”); Mark Ishman, Comment, Computer Crimes and the Respondeat 
Superior Doctrine: Employers Beware, 6 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 6, ¶ 6 (2000)
(describing ease of emailing documents, business strategies and other
information); Stephen Labaton, Downturn and Shift in Population Feed Boom in 
White-Collar Crime, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2002, at A1 (discussing increased education 
level of society as reason for increase in trade secret theft, fraud and white collar 
crime over other crime: “The take is better and the punishment is generally less”);
Moore, supra note 11, at 3A.
20. Toren, supra note 19, at 61 n.7; Richmond, supra note 13, at B11F 
(describing former employees’ acts of revenge, including theft of trade secrets and 
quoting internet security expert: “Golden parachutes and promises of
recommendations that companies often barter for graceful exits—and swift escorts 
to the door—aren’t always enough . . . . ‘We’re seeing what former employees are 
trying to do right after they’ve signed the release and collected the severance.’”) 
(quoting Tom Noonan, Chief Executive, Internet Security Systems).
21. Ted Brindis & Dennis K. Berman, Three Charged in Lucent Software Theft—
Suspects Allegedly Planned to Sell Internet Data Software for Voice Data in China, WALL ST.
J., May 4, 2001, at A3 (describing Lucent employees’ formation of their own 
company, joint venture with Chinese telecom, and theft of Lucent’s PathStar 
system software blueprints, worth “hundreds of millions” of dollars, in hopes of 
becoming “Cisco of China”).
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take, disclose or use their former employers’ trade secrets and 
confidential or proprietary information.
In some cases, the new employer is involved in or aware of the 
employee’s misappropriation of the former employer’s
information, or later ratifies the employee’s misconduct,22 giving
rise to a host of liabilities that are not the subject of this article.
However, in many other instances, the new employer is unaware of 
the employee’s misconduct and may have explicitly prohibited such 
activity. Even in cases in which the new employer did not
intentionally engage in, promote, or even know about, the theft or 
use of the former employer’s trade secrets, the new employer might 
still be held liable for the employee’s actions under various theories 
of recovery, including the common law theory of respondeat
superior or vicarious liability.23
Masters have long been held responsible for their servants’ 
actions, even those actions the master has forbidden.24  In early 
22. Tennant Co. v. Advance Mach. Co., 355 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1984) (quoting Hale v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 42 Cal. Ct. App.3d 681, 692-93 (1974)).
Anything which convincingly shows the intention of the principal to 
adopt or approve the act in question is sufficient.  It may also be shown 
by implication . . . “where an agent is authorized to do an act, and he 
transcends his authority, it is the duty of the principal to repudiate the 
act as soon as he is fully informed of what has been thus done in his 
name . . . else he will be bound by the act as having ratified it by 
implication.”
Id.
23. See Joel M. Androphy et al., General Corporate Criminal Liability, 60 TEX. B.J.
121, 126-28 (1997) (stating that employer may be held liable even if employee
acted contrary to corporate policy or instructions); John E. Davidson, Reconciling
the Tension Between Employer Liability and Employer Privacy, 8 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS.
L.J., 145, 180 (1998) (recognizing trend to hold innocent employer liable for 
employee’s wrongful activities).
24. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Agency, 4 HARV. L. REV. 345, 348 (1891); see
also Harold J. Berman & Charles J. Reid, Jr., The Transformation of English Legal 
Science: From Hale To Blackstone, 45 EMORY L.J. 437, 463 (1996) (noting
“incorporation into the common law of the doctrine of the vicarious liability of 
employers for harm caused by negligent acts of their servants (respondeat
superior)”).
This development was also a contribution of Lord Holt, who imported 
it into the common law chiefly from maritime law, which was then 
understood as part of the law of nations. See Boson v. Sandford, 91 Eng. 
Rep. 382 (1691), a maritime case brought by owners of cargo against 
the owners of a ship for damage done to the cargo while it was under 
the supervision of the ship’s master. The owners of the ship disavowed 
liability, because they had not personally undertaken to ship the goods, 
but Lord Holt held that ‘whoever employs another is answerable for 
6
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times, the family or mercantile household included servants, often 
chosen when young and remaining until death.  In this context, the 
household or business was regarded as a unit, and the act of any 
member of the unit was the responsibility of its head.25  From its 
Roman origins to the early English incarnations, the theory of 
respondeat superior, meaning literally “let the superior reply,” was
typically invoked to hold the master responsible only for those acts 
of his servant that were commanded by him, or that were
negligently performed by the servant in furtherance of the master’s 
endeavors.26  However, around 1700, the English common law 
expanded the legal theory of vicarious liability for the unauthorized 
and even forbidden acts of the servant as they were incidental to, or 
foreseeable in light of, the nature of the servant’s work.27  This 
him, and undertakes for his care to all that make use of him.’
Id. at 463 n.50.  Similarly, countries have been held responsible for their citizen’s 
unlawful acts.  Under the laws of Marseilles and other jurisdictions if a foreign 
citizen stole from a citizen of that jurisdiction, the thief’s government and its other 
citizens were held responsible for the theft. See HALLAM, supra note 3, at 63-64.
25. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 cmt. a (1958) (discussing 
history of agency law).
26. Laura L. Hirschfeld, Legal Drugs? Not Without Legal Reform: The Impact of 
Drug Legalization on Employers Under Current Theories of Enterprise Liability, 7 CORNELL
J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 757, 760 (1998); see also id. at 780 n.70 (citing Holmes, supra
note 24, at 355 (finding a basis for the concept of respondeat superior in English 
law as far back as the Norman Conquest)); John H. Wigmore, Responsibility for 
Tortious Acts: Its History, 7 HARV. L. REV. 315, 335 (1894) (observing “[w]e are safe 
in concluding that by the end of the 1200s . . . the master could pretty generally
exonerate himself by pleading that he had not commanded or consented to the 
act . . . .”) (citation omitted).
27. See Gary T. Schwartz, The Hidden and Fundamental Issue of Employer Vicarious
Liability, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1739, 1746 (1996) (describing series of opinions, mostly 
by Justice Holt, that adopted vicarious liability and noting that none of these cases 
involved personal injury) (citing Boson v. Sandford, 87 Eng. Rep. 212 (1689); 
Hern v. Nichols, 91 Eng. Rep. 256 (1709); Lane v. Cotton, 88 Eng. Rep. 853 
(1701); Jones v. Hart, 91 Eng. Rep. 382 (1698); Turberville v. Stampe, 91 Eng. 
Rep. 1072 (1697)).  Professor Schwartz continues to describe the doctrine’s rocky 
start:
In any event, employer vicarious liability, having been accepted in 
England in the early 1700s, was then accepted by American courts in 
the early 1800s. Still, there were some hesitations. For example, the 
doctrine was rejected, at least at first, in New Hampshire.  Also, when 
courts faced the issue of the employer’s vicarious liability to an injured 
employee, the courts, in adopting the fellow-servant rule, gave the 
vicarious liability doctrine a distinctly narrow interpretation.
Furthermore, over time a number of leading American analysts
expressed doubts about vicarious liability.
Id.  at 1746-47 (citations omitted).
7
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development caused great apprehension among English scholars 
and jurists since there was little precedent in English, Roman, or 
even Germanic law for imposing liability on one who had no legal 
or moral fault in the action.  But the rationale that the master and 
servant were “one person” prevailed.28
The twentieth century ushered in new approaches to vicarious 
liability law that were based primarily on economic policies that 
many scholars have questioned and that some have characterized as 
grounded in nineteenth century socialist and communist
philosophies,29 reliance on dicta and misinterpretations of
28. See Hirschfeld, supra note 26, at 781 n.72 (citing Holmes, supra note 24, at
350 (arguing that this particular justification arose from the imposition of liability
on the head of the household for the acts of a slave or wife, both of which were 
considered possessions, or chattels, of the master, and not free persons)); see also
Wigmore, supra note 26, at 317 (stating “[t]he doer of a deed was responsible 
whether he acted innocently or inadvertently, because he was the doer . . . the 
owner of an animal, the master of a slave, was responsible because he was 
associated with it as owner, as master.”).
29. See Hirschfeld, supra note 26, at 785; see also id. at 785-90 (discussing 
evolution of “deep pocket” or “long purse” justification for vicarious liability and 
its socialistic roots and criticizing disregard of precedent).  Professor Hirschfeld 
observes  the notion that because the employer can pay, the employer should pay, 
has trumped all other justifications according to the socialist theories that underlie 
the twentieth century American law of vicarious liability. Id. at 790.  Hirschfeld 
examines the socialistic rhetoric of, among others, Professor Warren Seavey:
[A]lthough it is in conformity with the spirit of our times to believe 
that if one is successful enough either to operate a business or to 
employ servants, in addition to the income taxes taking off the upper 
layers of soft living, he should pay for the misfortunes caused others by 
his business or household.  This, of itself, may not be a sufficiently 
strong reason. . . . . To-day, however, we realize that the loss from 
accident usually falls upon the community as a whole . . . . The business 
enterprise, until it becomes insolvent, can shift losses imposed upon it 
because of harm to third persons to the consumers who ultimately
pay . . . . It is this which is leading to the extension of absolute liability.
Id. at 790 (quoting Warren A. Seavey, Speculations as to “Respondeat Superior,” in 
HAR. LEGAL ESSAYS 433 (1934)).  Furthermore, “Professor Laski grounded his . . .
justifications for respondeat superior in the popular socialist philosophy of his day, 
proclaiming a ‘social interpretation of negligence’ and a ‘frankly communal
application of the law,’ with the ‘promotion of social solidarity’ as its end.” Id. at 
786 (citing Harold J. Laski, The Basis of Vicarious Liability, 26 YALE L.J. 105, 112 
(1916)).  Professor Laski also stated:
[T]he employer is himself no more a public servant . . . . If that 
employer is himself compelled to bear the burden of his servant’s torts 
even when he himself is personally without fault, it is because in a 
social distribution of profit and loss, the balance of least disturbance 
seems thereby best obtained.
Id. at 787-88 (citing Laski, supra, at 112).
8
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precedent.30 Despite the fact that the Industrial Revolution
shattered the old master-servant model and introduced the modern 
concept of “employment,”31 the vicarious liability doctrine is alive 
and well today, albeit with updated justifications discussed in
further detail below.
Minnesota and other jurisdictions have previously considered 
employer liability for its employee’s theft of trade secrets,32 but in 
30. See Hirschfeld, supra note 26, at 788 n.109 (citing Professor Thomas Baty); 
Rhett B. Franklin, Comment, Pouring New Wine into an Old Bottle: A Recommendation
for Determining Liability of an Employer Under Respondeat Superior, 39 S.D. L. REV. 570, 
574 n.34 (1994) (stating that modern phase of the doctrine of respondeat
superior stems from the dicta of Lord Holt).  Professor Hirschfeld stated:
In his book entitled Vicarious Liability, Professor Thomas Baty argues 
that the two English cases most often cited for the origin of the 
“modern” notion of respondeat superior—Turberville v. Stampe, 91 Eng. 
Rep. 1072 (1697), and Hern v. Nichols, 91 Eng. Rep. 256 (1709)—were
misinterpreted. THOMAS BATY, VICARIOUS LIABILITY 21-22 (1916). Baty 
maintains that Turberville v. Stampe was not a respondeat superior case 
at all, but a case of absolute liability—the non-delegable duty to safely 
maintain the use of fire on one’s premises. See id. at 19-20.  He also 
points out that Hern v. Nichols sounded not in tort, but in contract, and 
that the buyer of nonconforming goods in that case would have had 
recourse against the seller in any event. See id. at 11-12.  Baty insists 
that later judges relied not upon the actual principles of law in those 
cases, but upon Lord Holt’s dicta: “These two cases of contract and of 
absolute public duty are irrelevant . . . . What one would like to know is 
the precise process by which Holt’s dicta acquired the force of law 
between, say, 1698 and 1725.” Id. at 28.  Having established that to his 
satisfaction, Baty concludes that respondeat superior is “a principle 
dubious in origin and unjust in operation . . . “ and that “it will, I think, 
be clear to most students that the doctrine of the employer’s
responsibility was due to no considered theory of civil liability, and to 
no survival of early mediaeval notions, but was derived from an
inconsiderate use of precedents and a blind reliance on the slightest 
word of an eminent judge.” Id. at 29.  Evidently it was not as clear to 
everyone else as it was to Baty, and he ultimately lost the argument—at
least for the time being.
Hirschfeld, supra note 26, at 788 n.109.
31. See Richard R. Carlson, Why The Law Still Can’t Tell an Employee When It Sees 
One and How It Ought To Stop Trying, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 295, 303-04
(2001) (discussing Blackstone’s commentaries on master-servant relationship,
evolution of employment relationship and Industrial Revolution) (citing
MATTHEW W. FINKEN ET AL., LEGAL PROTECTION FOR THE INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYEE 3-10
(2d ed. 1996)); Hirschfeld, supra note 26, at 781.
32. See, e.g., Kasner v. Gage, 281 Minn. 149, 149, 161 N.W.2d 40, 41 (1968) 
(considering vicarious liability claim for agent’s misappropriation of competitor’s
business records); Newport News Indus. v. Dynamic Testing, Inc., 130 F. Supp.2d 
745, 753-54 (E.D. Va. 2001) (holding that under Virginia Uniform Trade Secrets 
Act, new employer could be liable for employee’s wrongful disclosure of former 
employer’s trade secrets under theory of respondeat superior); Cont’l Data Sys., 
9
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Hagen v. Burmeister & Associates, Inc.,33 the Minnesota Supreme 
Court evaluated for the first time vicarious liability for violation of 
the Minnesota Uniform Trade Secret Act.  This article discusses the 
evolution of the two bodies of law, misappropriation of trade 
secrets and vicarious liability involved in Hagen, and how the 
Minnesota Supreme Court approached these issues.
II. CIVIL MISAPPROPRIATION OF TRADE SECRETS
A. Introduction
Trade secrets and other information have become very
valuable assets, and many businesses attempt to protect their 
confidential information by requiring employees, business partners 
and other third parties to sign nondisclosure and non-competition
agreements.  The beauty of the nondisclosure agreement lies in the 
fact that the parties define the information covered and agree on 
the restrictions on use and disclosure of this information.34
Similarly, the parties agree on the time, scope and geographical
restrictions in a non-competition agreement.  If the receiving party 
breaches its obligations under the confidentiality or non-
competition agreement, the disclosing party has a breach of
contract claim.  Many commentators believe that these types of
agreements protect trade secrets far better than the common law of 
trade secrets.35
Prior to 1860, breach of contract—assuming a contract
existed—was the only basis of recovery for wrongful use or
disclosure of secret information.36  “Trade secret law” is distinct
Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 638 F.Supp. 432, 442-43 (E.D.Pa. 1986) (considering in 
vicarious liability action whether software program misappropriated by former 
employee constituted protectable trade secret); Chanay v. Chittenden, 563 P.2d 
287, 294 (Ariz. 1977) (observing possibility of new employer’s liability for new 
secretary’s misappropriation of former employer’s trade secrets if committed in 
the course of employment).
33. 633 N.W.2d 497 (Minn. 2001).
34. However, courts may not always enforce such agreements according to 
their terms.  Bone, supra note 4, at 244.
35. Patrick Garry, The Relationship between Employment Agreements and Trade 
Secret Litigation in Minnesota: The Evolution of Trade Secret Law from Cherne to Electro-
Craft, 11 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 501, 525 (1985); Bone, supra note 4, at 301-02.
36. Bone, supra note 4, at 251-52.
Prior to 1860, courts simply dealt with specific legal issues in the course 
of deciding suits involving express agreements not to use or disclose 
10
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from contract law.37  Simply put, trade secret law recognizes that 
regardless of whether a confidentiality agreement exists, certain 
information that rises to the level of “trade secrets” is property and 
theft of that property may result in civil (or criminal) liability.38
However, the burden of proving the elements of a trade secret 
claim is much higher than enforcing a valid confidentiality or non-
compete agreement.  This section deals with the tort of trade secret 
theft, rather than contract law, as it applies to trade secrets.
Trade secret law evolved as an embodiment of natural
principals of property.39  The public policies underlying trade 
secret laws today are: (1) the maintenance of commercial morality; 
(2) the encouragement of invention and innovation; and (3) the 
protection of the fundamental right of privacy of the trade secret 
owner.40
Generally, two elements must be satisfied in order to establish 
a trade secret infringement claim: (1) the information qualifies as a 
“trade secret,” and (2) the defendant wrongfully obtained, used or 
disclosed the information—whether by breach of confidence, theft, 
bribery, misrepresentation or other improper means.41  Courts have 
long struggled with determining whether a certain piece of
information qualifies as a trade secret or should be treated as a 
secret information.  These issues included whether courts of equity had 
jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief (they did), and whether
agreements not to use or disclose were void as unlawful restraints on 
trade (they were not).  All these issues were decided on the basis of 
established legal principles, though they were decided with some
difficulty due to the intangible nature of the new subject matter.  No 
court tried to expound a general theory, but by the middle of the 
nineteenth century, there were enough suggestions in the opinions for 
a general theory to emerge.
Id. (citations omitted).
37. Id. at 244.
38. See id. at 245.
39. Id.  at 253-54 (describing evolution of trade secret law).  The development 
of trade secret law and its historical rationales are not the topic of this article, as 
they are covered in excellent detail elsewhere. See id. at 252-60.
40. 1 MELVIN F. JAGER, TRADE SECRETS LAW § 1.05, at 1-15 (1997); see also Bone, 
supra note 4, at 261-83 (analyzing various policy arguments for trade secret law, 
including increasing incentives to create and reducing the level of private
investment in discovering and protecting secrets as well as the transactions costs 
associated with value-enhancing transfers); Tucker, supra note 13, at 1121
(describing reduction in incentives for innovative behavior as effect of economic 
espionage).
41. Jostens, Inc. v. Nat’l Computer Sys., Inc., 318 N.W.2d 691, 701 (Minn. 
1982).
11
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matter of general knowledge.42  Both the Restatement of Torts and 
the Uniform Trade Secrets Act emerged to provide uniform
guidelines for determining protectable trade secret status.  The 
First Restatement of Torts43 reduced the conflicting and unwieldy 
body of precedent down to a fairly clear definition and set of 
liability rules.44  Later the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (“UTSA”)45
emerged, and several states, including Minnesota, enacted their 
versions of this act.  Minnesota adopted its version of the UTSA on 
August 1, 1980.46  Minnesota was the first state to do so, but others 
soon followed.47  Most recently, the American Law Institute’s Third 
Restatement of Unfair Competition has jumped into the fray and 
attempted to codify trade secret doctrine.48
B. Minnesota Trade Secret Law Before the Minnesota Uniform Trade 
Secrets Act
The common law of trade secrets in Minnesota prior to
adoption of the Minnesota Uniform Trade Secrets Act (“MUTSA”) 
was defined primarily by two cases, Cherne Industrial, Inc. v. Grounds 
& Associates, Inc.49 and Jostens, Inc. v. National Computer Systems.50  In 
Cherne, the Minnesota Supreme Court developed a definition of 
“trade secret,” basically adopting the four-part test of the
Restatement of Torts section 757.  To be a trade secret the 
information must: (1) not be generally known or readily
ascertainable; (2) provide a competitive advantage; (3) have been 
developed at plaintiff’s expense; and (4) be the subject of plaintiff’s 
intent to keep it confidential.51
42. Alois Valerian Gross, Annotation, What is “Trade Secret” so as to Render 
Actionable Under State Law Its Use or Disclosure by Former Employee, 59 A.L.R.4th 641 §
2(a) (1988).
43. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS (1939).
44. Bone, supra note 4, at 247.
45. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT, 14 U.L.A. 433 (1985).  The National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform Laws drafted the Act, and the
American Bar Association approved it in 1979.  Bone, supra note 4, at 247 n.18.
46. MINN. STAT. §§ 325C.01-.08 (2001).
47. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325C, Refs & Annos (2002 Electronic Update) 
(indicating that Louisiana, Kansas, Arkansas, Washington, Idaho, Delaware and 
Indiana adopted versions in the following 2 years, with a total of 44 jurisdictions 
having adopted UTSA in 2002).
48. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 39-45 (1995).
49. 278 N.W.2d 81 (Minn. 1979).
50. 318 N.W.2d 691 (Minn. 1982).
51. Cherne Indus., Inc. v. Grounds & Assoc., Inc., 278 N.W.2d 81, 90 (Minn. 
1979).  The Cherne court used this same definition to determine what constituted
12
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In Jostens, the Minnesota Supreme Court applied a three-part
test for establishing a cause of action for misappropriation of a 
trade secret: (1) a trade secret must exist based on the Cherne test; 
(2) the defendant must have acquired the information as a result of 
a confidential relationship; and (3) the defendant must have used 
or disclosed the trade secret.52  In Jostens, the court found that the 
system at issue failed to meet two of the four requirements of the 
Cherne test for a trade secret: the system was readily ascertainable 
because it was not novel, and the plaintiff did not show an intent to 
keep the system secret.53
C. The Minnesota Legal Landscape After Adoption of the Minnesota
Uniform Trade Secrets Act
As stated above, in 1980, Minnesota adopted the MUTSA, 
which is basically similar to the Cherne and Jostens tests.  Among 
other things,54 the MUTSA provided statutory definitions for “trade 
secret,”55 “misappropriation”56 and “improper means.”57
“confidential information” for purposes of the plaintiff’s contract claim. Id. at 89-
90.
52. Jostens, Inc. v. Nat’l Computer Sys., 318 N.W.2d 691, 701-02 (Minn. 1982) 
(citing three-prong test in Eutectic Welding Alloys Corp. v. West, 281 Minn. 13, 18, 160 
N.W.2d. 566, 570 (1968)).
53. Id. at 698-701.
54. The MUTSA also provides for money damages, injunctive relief, punitive 
damages and attorneys’ fee in certain cases. MINN. STAT. §§ 325C.02-325C.04
(2001).
55. MINN. STAT. § 325C.01 subd. 5 (2001).
“Trade secret” means information, including a formula, pattern,
compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process, that:
(i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from 
not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable 
by proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic 
value from its disclosure or use, and
(ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the
circumstances to maintain its secrecy.
The existence of a trade secret is not negated merely because an 
employee or other person has acquired the trade secret without
express or specific notice that it is a trade secret if, under all the 
circumstances, the employee or other person knows or has reason to 
know that the owner intends or expects the secrecy of the type of 
information comprising the trade secret to be maintained.
Id.
56. MINN. STAT. § 325C.01 subd. 3 (2001).
“Misappropriation” means:
13
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The MUTSA was intended to carry forward, explain and clarify
the existing Minnesota common law, not replace it.  The MUTSA 
itself states that it displaces conflicting Minnesota law by providing 
civil remedies for misappropriation of a trade secret.58  The act 
further explicitly states that it does not affect “(1) contractual 
remedies whether or not based upon misappropriation of a trade 
secret; (2) other civil remedies that are not based upon
misappropriation of a trade secret; or (3) criminal remedies,
whether or not based upon misappropriation of a trade secret.”59
In 1983, in Electro-Craft Corp. v. Controlled Motion, Inc., the 
Minnesota Supreme Court applied the MUTSA to a case involving 
allegations that former employees of the plaintiff, a specialized 
motor manufacturer, misappropriated the plaintiff’s trade secrets
for use in starting up their own company to compete with the 
plaintiff.60  All of the accused employees had signed confidentiality 
agreements when they were hired, but not non-compete
agreements.61
(i) acquisition of a trade secret of another by a person who knows or 
has reason to know that the trade secret was acquired by improper 
means; or
(ii) disclosure or use of a trade secret of another without express or 
implied consent by a person who
(A) used improper means to acquire knowledge of the trade 
secret; or
(B) at the time of disclosure or use, knew or had reason to know 
that the discloser’s or user’s knowledge of the trade secret was
(I) derived from or through a person who had utilized
improper means to acquire it;
(II) acquired under circumstances giving rise to a duty to 
maintain its secrecy or limit its use; or
(III) derived from or through a person who owed a duty to the 
person seeking relief to maintain its secrecy or limit its use; or
(C) before a material change of the discloser’s or user’s position, 
knew or had reason to know that it was a trade secret and that 
knowledge of it had been acquired by accident or mistake.
Id.
57. MINN. STAT. § 325C.01 subd. 2 (2001).  “‘Improper means’ includes theft, 
bribery, misrepresentation, breach or inducement of a breach of a duty to 
maintain secrecy, or espionage through electronic or other means.” Id.
58. MINN. STAT. § 325C.07(a).
59. MINN. STAT. § 325C.07(b).
60. Electro-Craft Corp. v. Controlled Motion, Inc., 332 N.W.2d 890, 893-96
(Minn. 1983).
61. Id. at 895.
14
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The Electro-Craft court emphasized that the existing common
law regarding trade secret misappropriation still applied, except to 
the extent it was modified by the MUTSA.62  In order to establish a 
claim, the plaintiff must show (1) the existence of a “trade secret,” 
and (2) “misappropriation” of that trade secret.63  This is basically 
the Jostens test with the second and third elements (wrongful 
acquisition and use/disclosure) combined and enhanced.
The court first considered whether a trade secret existed.  It 
looked to the MUTSA definition and broke it down into three 
mandatory components: (1) whether the information was not 
generally known to and not readily ascertainable by proper means 
by other persons; (2) whether the information had some
independent economic value; and (3) whether reasonable efforts 
had been made to maintain its secrecy.64  The Electro-Craft court 
found that the first two requirements of the “trade secret”
definition were present,65 but that the plaintiff failed to establish 
the third requirement, secrecy.66
The court provided guidance with respect to each of these 
components of the MUTSA trade secret definition.  First, the 
system satisfied the “not generally known or readily ascertainable” 
requirement because it was a unique combination of features that 
could not be readily reverse engineered.67  The complexity and 
detail of the data affected ascertainability.68  Also, novelty is not a 
requirement to the same extent as it is with patents, but some 
novelty is required.69  The court noted that the law of trade secrets 
does not protect talent or expertise, only secret information.70
Next, the court interpreted the “independent economic value” 
requirement as analogous to the common law “competitive
advantage” requirement.71  The court observed that this does not 
require that the owner of the trade secret be the only one in the 
market because several developers of the same information, for 
example, may have trade secrets in that information.72  Rather, this 
62. Id. at 898.
63. Id. at 897.
64. Id. at 899-901.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 903.
67. Id. at 899.
68. Id.
69. Id.
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component can be satisfied by a showing that an outsider would 
gain a valuable share of the market by obtaining that information.73
This element can also be established by evidence that the owner 
would lose value if the outsider, armed with the owner’s
information, could enter the market—thereby cutting into the 
owner’s market share—“without a substantial development
expense.”74
Last, the court explained that a showing of actual, continuing 
efforts to maintain secrecy, not just intent, is essential to satisfy the 
secrecy component.75  It relied heavily on existing common law in 
its analysis and emphasized that it is critical that the owner itself 
continuously treated the information as confidential and that the 
owner informed its employees in no uncertain terms that the 
information at issue was secret and should not be disclosed.76  The 
court considered the owner’s physical security measures (efforts to 
protect information from discovery by outsiders, such as use of 
guards, locks, filing practices, disposal practices, etc.) and
confidentiality procedures (efforts to inform employees and others 
of confidential nature of information, such as confidentiality
notifications to employees and third parties, policies,
confidentiality markings on documents, access, etc.) but noted that 
the level of measures required would vary on a case by case basis.77
The court concluded that the owner’s relaxed physical security 
measures and confidentiality measures failed to demonstrate any 
effort to maintain secrecy,78 and therefore the information could 
not be considered a trade secret.79
The Electro-Craft court also considered the “misappropriation”
requirement even though the court was not required to reach this 
73. Id.
74. Id. at 900-01.
75. Id. at 901.
76. Id. at 901-02.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 901-03.  The court noted that some entrances were unlocked, the 
badge system had been abandoned, discarded drawings and plans for the motors 
were simply thrown away rather than destroyed, motor drawings were not kept in a 
central or locked location, none of the technical documents were marked
“confidential” and drawings and other confidential information were sent to 
customers and vendors without special marking, the owner never issued a policy 
regarding what it considered confidential, and the public had been invited to 
observe the manufacturing process during an “open house.” Id. at 902-03.
79. Id. at 902.
16
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issue.80 Under the MUTSA, misappropriation requires some
showing that the acquisition, disclosure or use of the information
occurred through improper means.81  In the employment context, 
this can be established by showing a duty to maintain secrecy.82
The owner’s failure to treat the information as confidential was 
fatal to its claim of a confidential relationship.83  A confidentiality 
agreement with only vague secrecy language could not create this 
duty unless employees were put on notice that the specific
information was secret and the employer treated it as such.84
The Electro-Craft decision set the standard for subsequent
Minnesota trade secret cases with respect to interpreting the 
MUTSA and determining whether information rises to the level of 
a trade secret.85
III. EMPLOYER VICARIOUS LIABILITY
A. Introduction
Oliver Wendell Holmes observed, “[i]n tort, masters are held 
answerable for conduct on the part of their servants, which they not 
only have not authorized, but have forbidden.”86  The Restatement 
of Agency states, and the United States Supreme Court has
confirmed, that a “master is subject to liability for the torts of his 
servants committed while acting in the scope of their
employment.”87  The general idea is that the employer should bear 
“the normal risks of doing business.”88  Under the respondeat 
80. Id. at 903.
81. MINN. STAT. § 325C.01 subd. 3 (2001).
82. Electro-Craft Corp. v. Controlled Motion, Inc., 332 N.W.2d 890, 903 
(Minn. 1983).
83. Id. at 901-03.
84. Id. at 903.
85. See Strategic Directions Group, Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 293 F.3d 
1062, 1064 (8th Cir. 2002) (applying Electro-Craft thee-part trade secret definition);
Widmark v. Northrup King Co., 530 N.W.2d 588, 592 (Minn. Ct. App.
1995)(applying the same formula).
86. Holmes, supra note 24, at 348.  The fact that the employer took steps to 
forbid certain conduct may actually result in a higher likelihood that the employer 
will be held liable for such conduct. See Doe v. United States, 912 F. Supp. 193, 
194 (E.D. Va. 1995) (acknowledging that tortious conduct is foreseeable if the 
employer has policies prohibiting such conduct).
87. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (1958); Faragher v. City of Boca 
Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 793 (1998).
88. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 776 (observing that proper inquiry was whether 
17
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superior doctrine, the employer “stands in the shoes” of its
employees as long as the conduct in question falls within the limits 
of the “scope of employment.”89
However, the scope of employment has been defined broadly 
enough to hold employers vicariously liable for intentional torts 
that were in no sense motivated by any purpose to serve the 
employer.90  In the often-cited case of Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. 
United States, for example, the Second Circuit charged the
Government with vicarious liability for the destruction caused by a 
sailor who returned to his ship from shore leave after a night of 
drinking, and in a drunken stupor, inexplicably opened valves that 
controlled water flow into the dry-dock where the ship was
docked.91  The resulting flood caused the ship to tilt, slide off its 
blocks and fall against the wall, partially sinking both the ship and 
the dry-dock.92  The Government argued that it should not be held 
liable to the dry-dock owner because the sailor’s actions were not 
within the scope of his employment.93  The Government relied on 
sexual harassment was one of the normal risks of doing business and rejecting 
mechanical application of Restatement factors).
89. Davis, supra note 19, at 689-90.
90. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 795-96.
Other examples of an expansive sense of scope of employment are 
readily found, see, e.g., Leonbruno v. Champlain Silk Mills, 229 N. Y. 
470, 128 N. E. 711 (1920) (opinion of Cardozo, J.) (employer was 
liable under worker’s compensation statute for eye injury sustained 
when employee threw an apple at another; the accident arose “in the 
course of employment” because such horseplay should be expected);
Carr v. Wm. C. Crowell Co., 28 Cal. 2d 652, 171 P.2d 5 (1946)
(employer liable for actions of carpenter who attacked a co-employee
with a hammer). Courts, in fact, have treated scope of employment 
generously enough to include sexual assaults. See, e.g., Primeaux v. 
United States, 102 F.3d 1458, 1462-63 (CA8 1996) (federal police 
officer on limited duty sexually assaulted stranded motorist); Mary M. 
v. Los Angeles, 54 Cal. 3d 202, 216-21, 814 P.2d 1341, 1349-52 (1991)
(en banc) (police officer raped motorist after placing her under 
arrest); Doe v. Samaritan Counseling Ctr., 791 P.2d 344, 348-49 (Alaska 
1990) (therapist had sexual relations with patient); Turner v. State, 494 
So. 2d 1291, 1296 (La. App. 1986) (National Guard recruiting officer 
committed sexual battery during sham physical examinations); Lyon v. 
Carey, 533 F.2d 649, 655 (CADC 1976) (furniture deliveryman raped 
recipient of furniture); Samuels v. Southern Baptist Hospital, 594 So. 
2d 571, 574 (La. App. 1992) (nursing assistant raped patient).
Id.
91. 398 F.2d 167, 168 (1968).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 170.
18
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the Restatement (Second) of Agency section 228(1) test for scope 
of employment, which requires that the employee’s actions are 
motivated, at least in part, by a desire to further the employer’s 
purposes.94  Judge Friendly acknowledged that the sailor’s conduct 
was not remotely motivated by a purpose to serve his employer.
However, Friendly rejected the motive test and instead relied on 
the “deeply rooted sentiment that a business enterprise cannot 
justly disclaim responsibility for accidents which may fairly be said 
to be characteristic of its activities.”  He thus imposed vicarious 
liability on the ground that the sailor’s conduct “was not so
‘unforeseeable’ as to make it unfair to charge the Government with 
responsibility.”95
B. Rationales for Holding the Faultless Employer Liable for the 
Misdeeds of its Employees
Since the Industrial Revolution and the shift in relationships 
between employers and employees, several rationales for the
concept of employer vicarious liability have been advanced,
producing erratic and inconsistent results.
Several scholars have provided thorough analyses of the
development of vicarious liability and the various attempts to
provide justifications from early English and American law through 
current day.96  This article will not address these rationales in detail,
but it is worth noting that many leading American analysts have 
expressed doubts about vicarious liability.  Professor Thomas Baty, 
often quoted in vicarious liability analyses, reviewed the various 
rationales in 1916 and found them deficient and not based on 
precedent, concluding that vicarious liability can only be explained 
as a “deep pockets” practice, causing some to note that Baty 
concluded that the doctrine is perverse.97
Oliver Wendell Holmes was “explicit in rejecting the victim’s 
need for compensation as an adequate reason for vicarious
liability.”98  Holmes generally supported strict liability when the 
defendant did know or could have foreseen the risks, but he 
94. Id.
95. Id. at 171.
96. See, generally, Hirschfeld, supra note 26; Schwartz, supra note 27.
97. Schwartz, supra note 27, at 1747 (citing Thomas Baty, VICARIOUS LIABILITY
146-54 (1916)); see also Hirschfeld, supra note 26, at 788 n.109.
98. Schwartz, supra note 27, at 1748 n.50 (citing Holmes, supra note 24, at 
357).
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argued vigorously against liability when the defendant’s conduct 
turned out to create unforeseeable risks:
Holmes remained hostile to most employer vicarious
liability.  According to Holmes, the doctrine marked a 
triumph of logic over common sense.  Common sense, in 
his view, is “opposed to making one man pay for another 
man’s wrong.”  The “logic” that Holmes had in mind was a 
perverse logic: the law’s eagerness to take to a logical 
extreme a legal fiction—drawn from history—that equates 
the employer and the employee. 99
Rationales in the vein of “liability without fault makes it
unnecessary to prove negligence, an often difficult task” and
“principals benefit from agents’ wrongful acts, even in cases where 
neither the principal nor society know it”100 seem untenable today.
The current rationales fall into two primary categories: fairness 
justifications and economic justifications.  Some popular fairness
rationales are:
(1) Employer should, in fairness, bear the resulting costs 
of doing business.101
(2) An unjust result would occur if an employer were 
allowed to gain from the honest and intelligent acts of 
its employees and yet not be responsible for the
wrongful acts of those under its employ, direction and 
for its benefit.102
(3) Employer should, in fairness, bear the resulting costs 
of misconduct that arose from or was in some way 
related to the employee’s essential duties.103
(4) Employer should, in fairness, bear the resulting costs 
99. Id. at 1747-48 (citing Holmes, supra note 24, at 345-46 and Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, Agency, 5 HARV. L. REV. 1, 14 (1891)).
100. Hirschfeld, supra note 26, at 789 (summarizing Professor Seavey’s
defenses for expansion of respondeat superior doctrine and citing Seavey, supra
note 29, at 147, 149).
101. Petro-Tech, Inc. v. W. Co. of N. Am., 824 F.2d 1349, 1358 n.10 (3d Cir. 
1987).
102. See id. at 1358 (explaining rationale for employer vicarious liability).
103. See, e.g., Samuels v. S. Baptist Hosp., 594 So. 2d 571, 574 (La. Ct. App. 
1992) (stating tortious conduct was “reasonably incidental” to the performance of 
the nursing assistant’s duties in caring for a “helpless” patient in a “locked
environment”).  This doctrine is based in a “deeply rooted sentiment that a 
business enterprise cannot justly disclaim responsibility for accidents which may 
fairly be said to be characteristic of its activities.”  Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. U.S., 
398 F.2d 167, 171 (2nd Cir. 1968).
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of its employee’s acts that were foreseeable.104
Popular economic rationales include:
(1) Self-regulation is more efficient than government 
regulation,105 at least during the time of service.  The 
master can control the activities of the servant, and 
the natural conclusion is that responsibility for the 
harm should rest with the party in control.106
(2) The employer should have a financial incentive to 
control the servant and to maintain close watch.107
Related to this is the concept that vicarious liability 
promotes better hiring and oversight by employers 
and gives employers strong incentives to shrewdly
select and supervise employees.108
(3) The public policy of risk sharing—corporations are 
deep pockets, providing another source from which a 
damaged party may recover damages.109  An injured 
plaintiff might not recover if only the employee was 
held liable.110
(4) General distrust of corporate power.111
104. See Ira S. Bushey & Sons, 398 F.2d at 171-72.
105. Davis, supra note 19, at 688 (citing Harvey L. Pitt & Karl A.
Groskaufmanis, Minimizing Corporate Civil and Criminal Liability: A Second Look at 
Corporate Codes of Conduct, 78 GEO. L.J. 1559, 1574 (1990)).
106. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 cmt. a (1958).
It is true that normally one in control of tangible things is not liable 
without fault.  But in the law of master and servant the use of the 
fiction that “the act of the servant is the act of the master” has made it 
seem fair to subject the non-faulty employer to liability for the
negligent and other faulty conduct of his servants.
Id.
107. See Lange v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 297 Minn. 399, 403, 211 N.W.2d 783, 785 
(1973).
108. See id. (observing that “[K]nowing that he is responsible, [employer] will 
be alert to prevent the occurrence of such injuries.”); Schwartz, supra note 27, at 
1758.
109. See Lange, 297 Minn. at 403, 211 N.W.2d at 785 (stating risk-sharing
justification for respondeat superior: Employer can and should ensure against 
such contingencies, or “by adjusting his prices so that his patrons must bear part, if 
not all, of the burden of insurance.  In this way, losses are spread and the shock of 
the accident is dispersed.”); Davis, supra note 19, at 688; Bradley J. Haight, Civil
RICO Section 1962(c): Vicarious Liability and Arguments for Expanding its Scope and 
Elements, CIV. RICO LITIG. REP. (May 1999), at 11.
110. See Lange, 297 Minn. at 403, 211 N.W.2d at 785; Davis, supra note 19, at 
688; Haight, supra note 109, at 11.
111. Davis, supra note 19, at 688 (citing Pitt & Groskaufmanis, supra note 105,
at 1574).
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(5) A desire to enforce corporate responsibility.112
As a result of these considerations, the courts of today have 
developed tests to provide guidance in predicting whether such a 
relation between the parties exists such that liability will be
imposed upon the employer for the employee’s conduct that is in 
the scope of employment.113  Regardless of the rationales, the 
courts now agree that the conduct must be within the “scope of 
employment”; however, many of the courts have created legal 
fictions in order to shoehorn into this definition misconduct that 
significantly deviates from authorized duties.
C. Scope of Employment Test
The Restatement (Second) of Agency reflects the traditional 
test to determine whether an employee’s conduct falls within the 
“scope of employment”:
(1) Conduct of a servant is within the scope of
employment if, but only if:
(a) it is of the kind he is employed to perform;
(b) it occurs substantially within the authorized time 
and space limits;
(c) it is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to 
serve the master, and
(d) if force is intentionally used by the servant against 
another, the use of force is not unexpectable by 
the master.
(2) Conduct of a servant is not within the scope of
employment if it is different in kind from that
authorized, far beyond the authorized time or space 
limits, or too little actuated by a purpose to serve the 
master.114
The Restatement (Second) of Agency at section 219 also offers
ten factors to be considered in deciding whether an employee’s 
conduct has occurred within the scope of employment.115
112. Tennant Co. v. Advance Mach. Co., Inc., 355 N.W.2d 720, 723 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 1984) (noting “[i]f we allow the master to be careless of his servants’ torts we 
lose hold upon the most valuable check in the conduct of social life”) (citing 
Laski, supra note 29, at 114).
113. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 cmt. a (1958).
114. Id. § 228.
115. Id. § 229(2).
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The United States federal and state courts, however, have 
diverged on which agency principles to apply and how to apply 
them.  The recent trend has been to expand the situations when an 
employer is liable while relaxing the requirements that the
employee’s acts be motivated by a purpose to serve or benefit the 
employer.116  As stated above, many courts have defined scope of 
employment so broadly to include intentional torts that were in no 
sense motivated by any purpose to serve the employer.  Minnesota 
has generally followed this trend, rejecting any notion that the 
employee’s motivation for his conduct is relevant to the inquiry; 
but in recent years, Minnesota courts have started requiring proof 
of some element of foreseeability of the misconduct by the
employer.  In this legal landscape, the presence or absence of 
expert testimony as to “foreseeability” often determines the
outcome of the case.
D. Minnesota Case Law—the Importance of Foreseeability and Expert 
Testimony
1. Pre-Lange Landscape
Prior to 1973, Minnesota courts generally followed the
Restatement of Agency in determining the “scope of employment” 
and imposed liability where the plaintiff demonstrated that the 
employee’s acts were motivated by a desire to further the
employee’s business.117  For example, in Kasner v. Gage the
Minnesota Supreme Court considered whether to hold a magazine 
sales company liable for its sales agent’s misappropriation of a 
competitor’s business records despite the fact that the company did 
not know of the unlawful acts or ratify them.118  The court stated 
that an employer cannot be liable for the tortious or criminal acts 
116. Domar Ocean Transp. v. Indep. Ref. Co., 783 F.2d 1185, 1190 (5th Cir. 
1986) (finding that “an act may be within the scope of employment although 
consciously criminal or tortious.”) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §
231(1958)); Martin v. Cavalier Hotel Corp., 48 F.3d 1343, 1351 (4th Cir. 1995) 
(stating that even “forbidden” or “consciously criminal or tortious” acts may still be 
within scope of employment).
117. Lange v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 297 Minn. 399, 401, 211 N.W.2d 783, 784 
(1973).
118. 281 Minn. 149, 150, 161 N.W.2d 40, 41 (1968).  In this case, the sales 
agent was a franchised dealer, rather than an employee, but in light of the nature 
of the relationship, the dealer was an “agent,” and the same vicarious liability 
principles applied. Id. at 152 n.4, 161 N.W.2d at 42.
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of an employee without a supported finding that the act “is
‘conduct . . . of the same general nature as that authorized, or 
incidental to the conduct authorized.’”119  The Kasner court then 
proceeded to consider the various factors set forth in section 
229(2) of Restatement (Second) of Agency120 and a comment in the 
Restatement section 248:
A master who authorizes a servant to compete with others 
and to do such acts as appear to the servant to be
reasonably necessary in order to make such competition 
effective is subject to liability to persons injured by
tortious acts committed in the course of such competition 
if intended for the benefit of the principal or master and 
if not an extraordinary or outrageous method of
conducting such competition.121
The Kasner court held, as a matter of law, that the sales agent’s 
conduct in misappropriating competitor’s records was not within 
the scope of any employment or agency relationship with his 
company.122  The court explained that despite the highly
competitive nature of the periodical business, there was no
evidence that one of the methods of competition in that business 
contemplated theft of competitors’ business records.123  In
declining to impose liability on the master, the court concluded 
that the agent’s theft of records was not the result of any
instruction or instrumentality furnished by the company and was 
“plainly a departure from the normal methods authorized for the 
accomplishment of its business objectives.”124
2. The Lange Scope of Employment Test
In 1973, in Lange v. National Biscuit Co., a case involving the 
assault of a grocery store manager by a cookie salesman, the
Minnesota Supreme Court acknowledged the “majority rule” at the 
time for determining “scope of employment” involved an inquiry
into: (a) whether conduct was motivated by business or personal 
considerations; or (b) whether the conduct was contemplated by 
119. Id. at 151-52, 161 N.W.2d at 42 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 229 (1958)).
120. Id. at 152, 161 N.W.2d at 42.
121. Id. at 152-153, 161 N.W.2d at 43.
122. Id. at 153, 161 N.W.2d at 43.
123. Id. at 154, 161 N.W.2d at 44.
124. Id. at 156, 161 N.W.2d at 44.
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the employer or incident to employment.125  However, the court 
rejected the notion that the employee’s motivation, that is, whether
or not in engaging in the misconduct the employee was motivated 
to further the employer’s business, should be a consideration and 
abandoned the motivation test.126
The Lange court discussed several rationales for imposing 
vicarious liability on an employer that is not at fault.  One
justification is that the employer, knowing that it will now be liable 
for all torts of its servants, can obtain insurance to cover such 
liabilities or pass along the cost to its customers in the form of 
higher prices,127 thus spreading the liability caused by the
wrongdoer among numerous innocent third parties.  The court 
also reasoned that the employer, knowing the expanse of his 
potential liability, would take action to prevent such occurrences in 
the future.128
The Lange court formulated the following two-prong test for 
employer vicarious liability for the intentional torts of its
employees, a test still followed today:
(1) the source of the conduct is related to the duties of 
the employee; and
(2) the conduct occurs with work-related limits of time 
and place.129
The second prong, work-related time and place, was satisfied
in Lange.  The court determined that, as a matter of law, the assault 
was related to the salesman’s work duties because the “precipitating 
cause of the initial argument concerned the employee’s conduct of 
his work.  In addition, the employee originally was motivated to 
become argumentative in furtherance of his employer’s
business.”130  The court noted that whether the argument at some 
point becomes personal and not related to the scope of
employment was not pertinent.131
125. 297 Minn. 399, 401, 211 N.W.2d 783, 784 (1973).
126. Id. at 402, 211 N.W.2d at 784.
127. Id. at 403, 211 N.W.2d at 785.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 404, 211 N.W.2d at 786.  Although Lange did not expressly overrule 
Kasner, it overruled former decisions to the extent they were inconsistent with its 
ruling. Id. at 405, 211 N.W.2d at 786.
130. Id. at 404, 211 N.W.2d at 786.
131. Id. at 404, 211 N.W.2d at 785-76.
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3. Development of the Foreseeability Requirement
After Lange, the Minnesota Supreme Court considered three 
employer vicarious liability cases, all involving sexual misconduct by 
the employee from which it developed the requirement that 
misconduct must at least be “foreseeable” in order to satisfy the first 
prong of the Lange scope of employment test.132  An accepted 
method of proving foreseeability was expert testimony that the 
tortious conduct at issue was a “well-known [industry] hazard.”133
In these cases, the decision often turned on whether the plaintiff 
had offered expert testimony on this issue.134
In Marston v. Minneapolis Clinic of Psychiatry & Neurology, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court considered the liability of a clinic for 
damages caused by an employee-psychologist who made
unwelcome and improper sexual advances to patients during and 
immediately after therapy.135  In cases brought by two patients and 
tried separately, the juries found that the clinic was not vicariously 
liable for the employee’s actions.136  The court noted that the 
doctor “intentionally departed from the standards of his profession, 
not . . . to cause harm . . . but rather to confer a personal benefit on 
himself.”137  Although the doctor’s conduct was entirely for his own 
benefit, a sharp departure from his normal duties, absolutely
forbidden, totally unethical and of no therapeutic purpose, the 
court found persuasive testimony that sexual relations between a 
psychologist and a patient was “a well-known hazard and thus, to a 
degree, foreseeable and a risk of employment.”138 The court
concluded that it should be a question of fact whether the
psychologist’s acts were “foreseeable, related to and connected with 
acts otherwise within the scope of employment.”139
In P.L. v. Aubert, the Minnesota Supreme Court assessed a 
132. Fahrendorff v. N. Homes, Inc., 597 N.W.2d 905, 911 (Minn. 1999); P.L. v. 
Aubert, 545 N.W.2d 666, 668 (Minn. 1996); Marston v. Minneapolis Clinic of 
Psychiatry and Neurology, 329 N.W.2d 306, 311 (Minn. 1982).
133. Fahrendorff, 597 N.W.2d at 911; Aubert, 545 N.W.2d at 668; Marston, 329
N.W.2d at 311.
134. Fahrendorff, 597 N.W.2d at 911, Aubert, 545 N.W.2d at 668; Marston, 329 
N.W.2d at 311.
135. 329 N.W.2d 306, 308 (Minn. 1982).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 310.
138. Id. at 311.
139. Id. The court reversed and remanded for new trials based on an error in 
the jury instructions. Id. at 311-12.
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school district’s liability for the misconduct of a teacher who
engaged in sexual contact with a minor student, including sexual 
relations on the school premises and, at times, during class hours.140
The court invoked the Lange two-prong scope of employment test, 
but distinguished the case from Marston based on the plaintiff’s 
failure to provide an affidavit or other evidence showing
foreseeability:
Here we find no evidence that such relationships between 
teacher and student are a “well-known hazard”; thus 
foreseeability is absent.  While it is true that teachers have 
power and authority over students, no expert testimony or 
affidavits were presented regarding the potential for abuse 
of such power in these situations; thus there can be no 
implied foreseeability.141
The Aubert court also concluded that the teacher’s actions with 
the student were unrelated to her duties as a teacher,142 but 
provided little explanation of the basis for its determination.  The 
court indicated that the first prong of the Lange test now required 
proof of relationship of the misconduct to the duties of the
employee and foreseeability.143  Interestingly, the Aubert court also 
found relevant the facts that the school district never observed the 
misconduct, took reasonable measures of supervision, and
adequately considered the safety and welfare of students.144
Although these factors may be relevant to a negligent supervision 
claim, they form no part of the Lange test for vicarious liability.
Next, in Fahrendorff v. North Homes, Inc., the Minnesota
Supreme Court considered a case in which a group home
counselor sexually assaulted a minor resident of the home.145
Taking a lesson from Marston and Aubert, the plaintiff in Fahrendorff
duly provided expert testimony that “inappropriate sexual contact 
or abuse of power in these situations, although infrequent, is a well 
140. 545 N.W.2d 666, 666 (Minn. 1996).
141. Id. at  668.  The Minnesota Supreme Court subsequently noted that since 
its decision in Aubert, the United States Supreme Court stated in a Title IX case 
that “[t]he number of reported cases involving sexual harassment of students in 
schools confirms that harassment unfortunately is an all too common aspect of the 
educational experience.”  Fahrendorff v. N. Homes, Inc., 597 N.W.2d 905, 911 n.1 
(Minn. 1999) (citing Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (1998)).
142. Aubert, 545 N.W.2d at 668.
143. Id. at 667-68.
144. Id. at 668.
145. 597 N.W.2d 905, 905 (Minn. 1999).
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known hazard in this field.”146  The trial court granted summary 
judgment in favor of the group home, and the court of appeals 
affirmed, based on their determinations that (1) like the teacher in 
Aubert, the counselor was acting for his own gratification and
therefore his conduct fell outside the scope of his employment, 
and (2) the affidavit was insufficient because it did not contain 
information specific to the counselor and did not conclude that 
this specific conduct by the counselor was foreseeable.147
The Minnesota Supreme Court disagreed.  First, the
Fahrendorff court concluded that a reasonable jury could find that
the counselor’s sexual contact with the plaintiff was related to his 
employment duties, citing Marston for the proposition that an 
employee’s actions may still be within the scope of employment 
even though motivated by personal gratification and prohibited by 
the employer.148  The court did not distinguish, however, the 
counselor’s conduct from the teacher’s conduct in Aubert.  Second, 
the court found that even though the expert affidavit was somewhat 
conclusory and lacked specific examples, it was exactly what the 
court relied on in Marston and what was lacking in Aubert.;
therefore it was sufficient to show foreseeability, at least enough to 
raise a question of fact to be determined by a jury.149
The Fahrendorff court also took the opportunity to clarify that
the standard for “foreseeability” in vicarious liability cases is
different than the standard used in negligence cases.150  In the 
negligence context, “foreseeable” means “a level of probability 
which would lead a prudent person to take effective precautions”,
whereas in the vicarious liability test, “foreseeability” merely means 
that “in the context of the particular enterprise an employee’s 
conduct is not so unusual or startling that it would seem unfair to 
include the loss resulting from it among other costs of the
employer’s business.”151
IV. HAGEN V. BURMEISTER & ASSOCIATES, INC.—EMPLOYER VICARIOUS
LIABILITY FOR MISAPPROPTIATION OF TRADE SECRETS
Against this background, the Minnesota Supreme Court
146. Id. at 909.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 911.
149. Id. at 911-12.
150. Id. at 912.
151. Id.
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approached these two issues, trade secrets and vicarious liability, in 
Hagen v. Burmeister & Associates, Inc.152 In Hagen, an employer 
sought review of the Minnesota Court of Appeals’ decision that the 
employer was vicariously liable for its employee’s theft of his former 
employer’s trade secrets, either on the theory of breach of contract 
or the tort of misappropriation of trade secret.153  The Minnesota 
Supreme Court (1) rejected the notion that vicarious liability is 
available for breach of contract;154  (2) determined that the MUTSA 
and breach of contract theories of recovery are not mutually 
exclusive—an employer may still be vicariously liable for the
intentional tort of trade secret theft even if the same conduct also 
constitutes breach of contract, for which the employer cannot be 
vicariously liable;155 (3) confirmed that the proper test for vicarious 
liability is the Lange scope-of-employment test, with an emphasis on 
foreseeability of the misconduct;156 (4) pointedly declined to
address the court of appeals’ conclusion that vicarious liability for 
violation of the MUTSA was possible and emphasized that its 
assumption that there is no legal prohibition to this proposition 
applied only to the Hagen case;157 and (5) assuming this
proposition, held that the plaintiff’s failure to introduce evidence
of either actual knowledge or foreseeability of the misconduct was 
fatal to its respondeat superior claim and reversed the court of 
appeals.158
In Hagen, the plaintiff, insurance agency Burmeister &
Associates, Inc. (“Burmeister”) purchased the assets of the Hagen 
Agency, Inc., which was owned by insurance agent Paul Hagen 
(“Hagen”).  At the same time it hired Hagen, first as a consultant 
and later as an employee.159  Hagen signed a confidentiality
agreement and a non-compete agreement, in which Hagen agreed 
not to disclose Burmeister’s policyholder information and not to 
sell or issue property or casualty insurance to Burmeister customers 
for a period of about ten years.160
Hagen subsequently resigned from Burmeister and went to 
152. 633 N.W.2d 497, 499 (Minn. 2001).
153. Id. at 499.
154. Id. at 503.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 504-05.
157. Id. at 504.
158. Id. at 505.
159. Id. at 499-500.
160. Id. at 500.
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work for a competitor, American Agency, Inc. (“American”).161
Burmeister reiterated its intent to enforce its rights with respect to 
its clients but stated that Hagen’s close friends and family
members, representing about fifty people, could keep their
business with Hagen.162  Burmeister informed American of his non-
compete and confidentiality agreements with Burmeister and
provided some description of the exceptions Burmeister allowed.
American understood that Hagen “had a good exit interview and 
that he was free to solicit some of the accounts . . . .”163
Hagen took customer information for about 1,000 Burmeister 
accounts and proceeded to send a solicitation letter on American 
stationary to 250 Burmeister accounts, representing about twenty to 
thirty percent of the accounts Hagen originally sold to
Burmeister.164  American was aware that Burmeister was sending out 
a letter, but was not aware of the number of letters sent or the 
recipients.165  Burmeister complained to Hagen, prompting an 
action by Hagen seeking a declaratory judgment that Hagen could 
compete with Burmeister.166  At this point, American learned about 
the controversy, contacted Burmeister, and agreed not to accept 
business from the customers at issue until the parties could meet to 
discuss the issue.167  The parties then met and agreed to a joint 
letter to the customers at issue, stating that the customers “have a 
right to select the insurance agent of their choice.”168  American 
believed the parties’ decision satisfactorily resolved the dispute and 
allowed Hagen to proceed with transferring business from some of 
the customers at issue.169  Burmeister, on the other hand,
apparently viewed the letter as merely damage control while it 
pursued its legal remedies.170
Burmeister asserted counterclaims against Hagen, including 
breach of contract, unjust enrichment and misappropriation of 
trade secrets.171  Burmeister subsequently filed a third-party









169. Id. at 500-01.
170. Id. at 501.
171. Id.
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which evolved into a respondeat superior claim.172  American did 
not challenge Burmeister’s change in recovery theories, so the 
court treated the respondeat superior claim as if it were pled.173
The trial court found Hagen liable for breach of contract and 
trade secret misappropriation as defined by the MUTSA.  However, 
it held as a matter of law that American was not vicariously liable 
for Hagen’s actions, reasoning that: (1) the MUTSA does not 
permit recovery against an employer when its employees
misappropriate trade secrets; (2) the applicability of common law 
respondeat superior tort theory to trade secret misappropriation
was not supported by law; and (3) even if respondeat superior were 
applicable, the claim failed because American “did not know, and 
had no reason to know” that Hagen’s conduct was not permitted.174
Burmeister appealed the trial court’s holding.  In Hagen I, the 
court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision with respect to 
the breach of contract claim, reasoning that the doctrine of
respondeat superior applies only to tortious conduct committed by 
an employee, not to an employee’s breach of contract in the 
absence of independent tortious conduct by the employer.175
However, the court of appeals reversed with respect to the claim for 
vicarious liability for trade secret misappropriation, holding that an 
employer can be held liable for an employee’s tort of trade secret 
misappropriation.176  The court of appeals held that the common 
law remedy of vicarious liability for intentional torts should be 
applied to the misappropriation of trade secrets, as with any other 
tort.177  The apellate court explained that although the MUTSA 
does not specifically provide for recovery against an employer for 
its employee’s violation of the MUTSA, the MUTSA remedies are 
not exclusive, and the MUTSA does not preclude common law 
vicarious liability claims.178  The court of appeals remanded the case 
172. Id.
173. Id. (citing MINN. R. CIV. P. 15.02 and T.W. Sommer Co. v. Modern Door & 
Lumber Co., 293 Minn. 264, 269, 198 N.W.2d 278, 281 (1972)).
174. Id. at 501.
175. Hagen v. Burmeister & Assoc. Inc., No. C8-98-864, 1999 WL 31130, *2-3
(Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 26, 1999).
176. Id. at *4.
177. Id.  Neither party sought review of the court of appeals’ decision to apply 
the respondeat superior doctrine to trade secret misappropriation. Id.
178. Id. at *3 (noting that MUTSA displaces only conflicting remedies).  The
MUTSA provides that it “displace[s] conflicting tort, restitutionary, and other law of 
this state providing civil remedies for misappropriation of trade secret.” MINN.
STAT. § 325C.07(a) (2001) (emphasis added).
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for further findings as to whether Hagen’s conduct fell within the 
scope of his employment with American, thus rendering American 
vicariously liable for Hagen’s actions.179
On remand, American argued that Hagen’s conduct fell
outside the scope of his employment because it was not reasonably 
foreseeable that Hagen would misappropriate trade secrets.180  The 
trial court agreed and granted summary judgment for American, 
explaining that American did not authorize or ratify Hagen’s
actions and no evidence demonstrated that the misappropriation 
of trade secrets is a well-known industry hazard.181
In Hagen II, the court of appeals again reversed, holding that 
Hagen was, in fact, acting within the scope of his employment when 
he misappropriated Burmeister’s trade secrets.182  The court of 
appeals stated that there are two vicarious liability tests, one
established in Kasner and the other in Lange.183  According to the 
court of appeals, the Kasner test applied to situations where the 
current employer authorized competition by the employee and the 
competition simply went too far, whereas the Lange test applied to 
other situations.184  The court of appeals determined that Hagen 
was acting within the scope of his employment and that American 
was vicariously liable for the improper solicitations because
American authorized the plan to make proper solicitations and 
assisted with that plan.185  American appealed that decision.
As a preliminary matter, the Minnesota Supreme Court upheld 
the court of appeals’ decision in Hagen I that vicarious liability is 
not available for breach of contract claims but rejected American’s 
claim that vicarious liability for tortious trade secret
misappropriation is not available where the underlying conduct is a 
breach of contract.186  The supreme court noted that American did 
not appeal the court of appeals’ decision to extend the doctrine of 
respondeat superior to trade secret misappropriation and, as a 
179. Hagen, No. C8-98-864, 1999 WL 31130, at *4.
180. Hagen v. Burmeister & Assoc., Inc., 633 N.W.2d 497, 502 (Minn. 2001).
181. Id.
182. Hagen v. Am. Agency, Inc., 617 N.W.2d 799, 804-05 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2000).
183. Id. at 802.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 804.
186. Hagen v. Burmeister & Assoc. Inc., 633 N.W.2d 497, 500, 503 (Minn. 
2001) (noting that American abandoned issue of whether client list was a “trade 
secret” as defined by MUTSA).
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result, that legal conclusion was not at issue.187  The supreme court 
declined to affirm this decision and pointed out throughout the 
opinion that it was only assuming for the limited purposes of the 
Hagen decision that vicarious liability could apply to an employee’s 
MUTSA violation.188
The Hagen court then proceeded with its analysis of the
respondeat superior doctrine and its application to the claim at 
issue.  The court stated that the scope-of-employment test as 
clarified in Lange was the proper test, rather than the earlier test 
enunciated in Kasner, which the district court and court of appeals
applied.189  The proper test for employer liability for an employee’s 
intentional tortious act involves a determination of (1) whether the 
tort was related to the employee’s duties; and (2) whether the tort 
occured within work-related limits of time and place.190  Hagen’s 
conduct clearly occurred within work-related time and place; the 
only question was whether his conduct was related to his duties as 
an American employee.
The court followed the Fahrendorff court’s consideration of 
whether the employee’s acts were “foreseeable, related to, and 
connected with the acts otherwise within the scope of his
employment.”191  The court also relied on the recent line of
Minnesota cases emphasizing the importance of the foreseeability 
factor in determining whether the first prong of the scope-of-
employment test is satisfied.192  The court stated that proof of 
foreseeability is crucial in order to satisfy the scope-of-employment
test and explained that proof can be established in a number of 
ways, including showing that the type of tortious conduct involved 
is a well-known industry standard.193  The court held that in the case 
at issue, Burmeister failed to prove or even raise a question of fact 
with respect to the foreseeability issue, which was fatal to its
respondeat superior claim.194  According to the court, American did 
not know or have reason to know that Hagen did not make
appropriate arrangements with Burmeister regarding the letters to 
customers, and Burmeister failed to introduce any other evidence 
187. Id. at 503.
188. Id. at 503, 504.




193. Id. at 504-05.
194. Id. at 505.
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of foreseeability, such as evidence demonstrating that the risk of 
employees misappropriating trade secrets is a well-known hazard in 
the insurance industry.195
It is clear that if Burmeister had introduced some expert 
testimony of misappropriation being a common hazard of the 
industry or some other showing of foreseeability, its claim may have 
survived.
V. MINNESOTA POST-HAGEN CASES
The Minnesota Court of Appeals applied Hagen in two
subsequent cases.  In Wilson v. Stock Lumber, Inc., the plaintiff 
claimed a lumber company was vicariously liable for its driver’s 
“road rage” assault on the plaintiff.196  The court of appeals
affirmed the trial court’s decision to grant summary judgment for 
the employer based on the plaintiff’s failure to produce evidence 
that the employee “could be expected to engage in assaultive 
conduct or that road rage is a well-known hazard in the delivery 
business.”197
In Boykin v. Perkins Family Restaurant, the court considered a 
restaurant’s liability for an employee’s sexual harassment and
battery of another employee on the job.198  The trial court granted 
summary judgment in favor of the employer, concluding that the 
employee’s misconduct was not foreseeable by the employer or 
otherwise related to or connected with acts within the scope of his 
employment.199  The court of appeals reversed.200  The court did not 
require expert testimony and instead determined that the fact that 
the employer had policies prohibiting sexual harassment,
conducted sexual harassment training and posted a “no-touch”
policy at the restaurant were all evidence of foreseeability of the 
employee’s misconduct.201
According to the Boykin court’s reasoning, all activities
expressly prohibited by an employer, by definition, satisfy the
“foreseeability” requirement because the employer must have
anticipated the conduct in order to prohibit it.
195. Id.
196. No. C3-01-623, 2001 WL 1182796, *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 9, 2001).
197. Id. at *14.
198. No. C9-01-1100, 2002 WL 4548, *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 2, 2002).
199. Id. at *3.
200. Id. at *7.
201. Id. at *4.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The continued expansion of vicarious liability theories has 
created a legal landscape in which employers are almost always 
held liable for their employees’ actions, no matter how outrageous, 
deliberate, or insubordinate they are, unless the plaintiff fails to 
present an expert at trial.
The current policy imposes “foreseeability,” and therefore 
liability in most cases, even where the employer has acted
responsibly and forbidden the misconduct.  One rationale for 
vicarious liability is to make employers more responsible.  Yet a 
policy of endless liability discourages employers from acting
responsibly because taking precautions does not prevent liability, 
and as the Boykin decision illustrates, could actually increase it.
Fairness is also ill-served.  The employer that has no knowledge 
of or involvement in the misconduct and has taken every
precaution to prevent it may still be held liable for an employee’s 
gross misconduct outside the scope of the employer’s business.
The rationale that other select innocent parties who are unlucky 
enough to do business with either the employer, the employer’s 
insurers, or the employer’s customers, can help defray the costs 
also does not serve the goal of fairness.
In the context of trade secret theft by employees, the
seemingly limitless expansion is especially frightening.  Holding a 
cookie company responsible for its salesman’s quarrel with a grocer 
seems relatively harmless.  However, in an era of multi-million
dollar trade-secret theft claims against employees by their former 
employers, an expanded vicarious liability policy could easily
destroy an employer, resulting in harm to shareholders, as well as 
loss of jobs, innovation, and productivity.  The original
justifications for vicarious liability, fairness and economic goals, are 
not served by such unjust and economically disastrous
consequences.
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